Podcast brief
Michael Trombley and Caleb on Emily Wilson's Critique of Epictetus
Michael Trombley and Caleb examine classicist Emily Wilson's three criticisms of Epictetus and test whether they hold up against the Discourses and Handbook.
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Epictetus and His Critics (Episode 234)
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The brief
Michael Trombley and Caleb take up a review by Emily Wilson that raises three criticisms of Epictetus, and they test each one against the text. Their overall verdict is that Wilson's first two criticisms rest on questionable readings of Stoic doctrine, while her third point, about grief and collective mourning, has real force.
Wilson's first charge is that Epictetus's focus on individual judgment crowds out collective political action against evils like slavery and poverty. Michael and Caleb treat this as a disagreement about emphasis rather than a genuine incoherence, since Epictetus's role ethics can be read as a precondition for effective collective action rather than a substitute for it. Michael goes further, arguing that the complaint often smuggles in a rival theory of value: Stoics do not classify poverty or slavery as harms in the Stoic sense, so the real dispute is about what counts as good and bad, not about whether Stoics care about other people.
Her second charge, that Stoicism functions as therapy for privileged men who keep fantasies of power by shrinking the domain where they claim control, gets a mixed response. Michael and Caleb reject the specific claim that the wise Stoic redirects desire for possessions through control of the will, since Epictetus explicitly tells students to give up that desire, and prohairesis, the faculty of choice, is identical with the self rather than something controlled from outside. But they accept the underlying observation that Stoicism appeals to a wish for permanence and internal power, and argue this is philosophically legitimate rather than a hidden flaw.
The third charge, that Epictetus's advice serves tranquility at the expense of relationships, is the one they reject most firmly, using his sick-child example: Michael argues Epictetus criticizes the father who leaves, rather than praising him for protecting his own feelings. Even so, they credit Wilson's closing point, that Epictetus overlooks how the Iliad shows grief eased through collective mourning, as her strongest observation, and one Stoic practice might take seriously.
Strongest arguments
Wilson's collective-action critique is about emphasis, not incoherence
5:42Wilson argues Epictetus focuses on what is up to the individual and ignores collective political action against things like slavery and poverty. Michael and Caleb agree this is a fair observation about emphasis but argue it does not show incompatibility, since Epictetus's role ethics and focus on correct judgment are preconditions for effective collective action.
The collective-action criticism smuggles in a rival value theory
16:41Michael argues that when critics say Epictetus neglects collective action, they are really objecting to Stoic value theory, which denies that things like poverty or slavery are themselves harms in the Stoic sense. The disagreement is less about a gap in Epictetus's interest and more a bedrock clash over what counts as good and bad.
Wilson's 'privileged men' argument rests on a misreading of prohairesis
20:51Wilson claims the wise Stoic never gives up desire for power and possessions but achieves them through control of the will. Michael and Caleb argue this misstates Epictetus, who explicitly tells students to give up desire for possessions, and that prohairesis is not a faculty you control from a distance but is identical with the self, so 'control over the will' is close to incoherent.
Stoicism does offer power, but internal power, and that is philosophically legitimate
30:00Michael and Caleb agree with the descriptive claim that Stoicism appeals to people seeking power, permanence, and autonomy, comparing it to a martial arts trope where training reshapes the student's original goal. They argue this is not a flaw: Stoicism clarifies rather than dissolves the question of what a good human life is, unlike traditions aimed at dissolving the self.
The sick-child example is about virtue, not tranquility
38:20Wilson argues Epictetus's advice fails at relationships, citing his example of a father who abandons his sick daughter to protect his tranquility. Michael argues this misreads the passage: Epictetus criticizes the father for failing his role as caregiver, and the mother and caregivers stay not to protect their own feelings but because staying is the right thing to do.
Stoics in training must sometimes set feelings aside for the sake of virtue
43:19Michael distinguishes the sage, who feels no conflict between tranquility and right action, from the Stoic in progress, who may need to act rightly despite fear or discomfort. This undercuts Wilson's framing that Stoic tranquility and caring for others are in tension.
Wilson's point about collective mourning in the Iliad is her strongest argument
46:40Caleb highlights Wilson's observation that Epictetus discusses Achilles' grief without mentioning how the Iliad's final books show grief eased through collective rituals of mourning. Both hosts find this a genuinely useful point, suggesting that transforming beliefs about loss may benefit from social and communal activity, not just individual reasoning.
Disagreements
Wilson versus Michael on whether Epictetus's advice serves relationships
38:56Emily Wilson argues, as presented by Michael, that Epictetus's teaching protects tranquility at the cost of genuine connection, pointing to the case of a father who leaves his sick child. Michael argues this is a clear misreading, since Epictetus criticizes the father's cowardice and holds up staying and caring for the child as the virtuous, not merely the tranquil, choice.
Wilson versus Michael on the psychological appeal of Stoicism
20:51Wilson claims the wise Stoic never gives up desire for power and possessions but redirects it through control of the will, implying Stoicism indulges fantasies of dominance. Michael and Caleb argue this contradicts Epictetus's explicit instruction to relinquish desire for possessions, and that prohairesis cannot be 'controlled' in the sense Wilson implies since it is identical to the self.
Concepts discussed
- Dichotomy of control Some things are up to us, namely our own judgments and actions, and everything else is not, and only the first kind is truly free and our own.
- Faculty of choice The inner capacity to respond to impressions and act, which is the only thing truly one's own and the seat of a person's good.
- Virtue Excellence of character, understood by the Stoics as the sole good and the basis of happiness.
- Tranquility Tranquility is defined as the good ordering of the mind, achieved by returning to brief fundamental principles.
- Desire and aversion Desire aims at getting what we want and aversion at avoiding what we dislike, and both must be restricted to what is in our control or they lead to disappointment and misery.
Philosophers and works discussed
- Epictetus
- Emily Wilson
- Discourses and Handbook By Epictetus.
Questions this episode answers
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What is prohairesis in Epictetus and why can't you control your own will?
27:35Prohairesis, the faculty of choice, is identified with the self rather than something the self observes and manipulates from a distance. Michael and Caleb argue you cannot control the controller, though you can become a better-equipped controller through practice.
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Is Stoicism just a therapy for privileged men who cannot control everything?
19:46Wilson suggests Epictetus's philosophy justifies fantasies of power and autonomy for privileged men by shrinking the domain where they claim control. Michael agrees this is descriptively part of Stoicism's appeal but argues it is philosophically legitimate, since Stoicism clarifies rather than indulges the desire for power by redirecting it toward internal excellence.
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What does Epictetus mean by kissing a child and telling yourself you are kissing a human being?
38:56Epictetus's advice to remember the mortality of loved ones is presented by Wilson as evidence Stoicism undermines relationships by prioritizing tranquility. Michael argues the point is about virtue and clear judgment, not protecting one's feelings, and that Epictetus criticizes rather than excuses a father who abandons his sick child for the sake of his own comfort.
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How does Stoic grief differ from grief eased through collective mourning rituals in the Iliad?
46:40Wilson points out Epictetus discusses Achilles' grief without noting how the Iliad shows grief eased through collective mourning and memorialization. Caleb and Michael agree this is a genuine blind spot, suggesting collective ritual may aid the kind of belief transformation Stoicism aims for.
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Is Stoic virtue focused only on the individual rather than the collective good?
16:41Michael argues that framing Stoicism as neglecting collective good often smuggles in a different theory of value, since Stoics do not treat things like poverty or slavery as harms in the same sense a modern critic does. The deeper disagreement is about what counts as good and bad, not whether Stoics care about other people.
Related primary passages
Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.
Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context
This is the founding statement of the dichotomy of control, the axis the rest of Epictetus's teaching turns on.
For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect tranquility; and I affirm that tranquility is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind.
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 4.3 Read in context
Marcus's core definition: tranquility is order in the mind, reached by returning to it, not by finding a quiet place.
Remember that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of his aversion wretched.
Epictetus, Handbook 2 Read in context
The opening move: desire and aversion are promises, and both can be broken.
Related pages
Sources
- Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations Primary text, Stoa library
- Stoa Conversations, Epictetus and His Critics (Episode 234) Podcast episode, original episode