Question
What does Epictetus advise about desire and aversion for beginners?
Epictetus tells the beginner to suspend desire almost entirely and redirect aversion only toward what is truly up to them.
Updated
The short answer
Epictetus tells the beginner to suppress desire almost entirely for the time being, since wanting anything outside your control guarantees disappointment, and to confine aversion only to what is contrary to the right use of your own faculties, since that is the one place aversion can never fail you. This is a training instruction for someone starting out in philosophy, not a description of the sage's final state. Everything else should be pursued and avoided only lightly, with reservation.
Key points
- Epictetus advises beginners to totally suppress desire for the present, because desiring anything outside your control leads to disappointment.
- He advises confining aversion only to what is contrary to the right use of your own faculties, which is fully in your control.
- Desiring or dreading externals like sickness, poverty, or reputation sets a person up for disappointment or wretchedness.
- The instruction still allows action: pursue and avoid appropriate things, but lightly and with reservation.
- This advice rests on the prior distinction between what is up to us and what is not, laid out in Handbook 1.
- The suppression of desire is temporary and aimed at beginners, not a final description of the sage.
The longer answer
Epictetus does not tell the beginner to feel less, or to want nothing forever. He gives a narrower, harder piece of advice: for now, suppress desire almost completely, and put aversion only where it belongs (Handbook 2).
The reasoning is built on the dichotomy of control laid out just before this passage: some things are up to us and some are not (Handbook 1). Opinion, pursuit, desire, and aversion are up to us. Body, property, reputation, and command are not. Desire and aversion are themselves faculties in our control, but what most people desire or turn away from, health, wealth, reputation, other people's opinions, is not.
Epictetus spells out why this matters with a simple structure. Desire promises that you will get what you want. Aversion promises that you will avoid what you dread. But whoever fails to get what he desires is disappointed, and whoever falls into what he is averse to is wretched (Handbook 2). If your aversion targets something outside your control, like sickness or poverty, you have no way to guarantee you will avoid it, so you are setting yourself up for wretchedness. The fix is not to feel differently about sickness and poverty. It is to relocate aversion entirely: confine it to what is contrary to the right use of your own faculties, things fully within your control, and you will never be caught by what you are averse to (Handbook 2).
Desire gets even blunter treatment. Epictetus says that for the present you should totally suppress desire, because desiring anything outside your control guarantees disappointment, and even the things that are in your control and worth desiring, like your own excellence of character, are not yet things you possess (Handbook 2). This is advice for someone still in training, not a final state. The word "for the present" matters: Epictetus is describing where a beginner should start, not the condition of the sage.
The common misreading treats this as a call to want nothing and fear nothing, a kind of flat emotional neutrality. That is not what the text says. Epictetus is not asking you to stop caring. He is asking you to stop misplacing desire and aversion on things you cannot secure. In the Discourses, Zeus's speech to Epictetus makes the same point from another angle: your body is not fully yours, it is clay finely tempered, but you have been given the faculty of pursuing and avoiding, of desire and aversion, as your own possession, and if you guard that faculty as your true property you will never be hindered, never lament, never blame (Discourses I 1). The instruction to suppress desire is not suppression of feeling as an end in itself. It is a redirection: stop investing your wanting and dreading in things that were never yours to secure.
What changes for someone who takes this seriously is not that they become passive. Epictetus tells the beginner to keep acting: use only the appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance, and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation (Handbook 2). You still pursue a job, a friendship, a piece of work. You just do it without loading your desire onto the outcome, since the outcome is not up to you. The desire and aversion that matter, that are genuinely yours to shape, concern your own judgments and choices, not whether you get the job or avoid the illness.
A concrete way to apply this: before you catch yourself wanting or dreading some external outcome today, ask whether it is fully in your power to secure or avoid. If not, practice acting toward it lightly, with reservation, and save your real desire and aversion for how you choose to act.
Primary passages
But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession.
Epictetus, Handbook 2 Read in context
The core instruction: not a permanent ban on wanting, but a beginner's discipline against misplaced desire.
If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own control, you will never incur anything to which you are averse.
Epictetus, Handbook 2 Read in context
Aversion, redirected to what is truly yours, can never fail you.
Remember that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of his aversion wretched.
Epictetus, Handbook 2 Read in context
Epictetus states the risk built into desire and aversion before showing how to defuse it.
Use only the appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation.
Epictetus, Handbook 2 Read in context
The advice is not passivity: you still act, but without staking your peace on the result.
Some things are in our control and others not. ... Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions.
Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context
The foundational division that makes sense of confining aversion and suspending desire.
Important distinctions
Suppressing desire versus feeling nothing
Epictetus's instruction to suppress desire for the present is not a demand for emotional flatness. It targets desire aimed at things outside your control, like wealth or health. Desire for your own excellence of character remains legitimate, he just notes you do not yet possess it, so pursuing it calls for effort, not craving its result.
A beginner's rule versus the sage's condition
The phrase for the present marks this as training advice. It describes where someone starting out should place their desire and aversion, not the settled state of someone who has mastered the discipline. The dichotomy of control is permanent, but the total suppression of desire is a temporary discipline for the untrained.
Objections and replies
Isn't suppressing desire just emotional suppression?
A reader might worry that telling someone to totally suppress desire sounds like the pop caricature of Stoicism as bottling up feeling.
Epictetus is not asking you to feel nothing. He is asking you to stop investing your desire in outcomes you cannot secure, like health or reputation, since that investment is what produces disappointment. The passage itself still allows pursuit and avoidance as actions, done lightly and with reservation, which is not suppression of action or of care, only of misplaced wanting.
Doesn't this advice ask too little of desire, forever?
If desire is suppressed only for beginners, a skeptic might ask what happens later, and whether Epictetus ever describes a mature form of desire.
The text marks this as advice for the present and notes that things in your control which it would be laudable to desire are not yet in your possession. That implies a future stage where desire for your own excellence becomes appropriate, once it is something you have actually cultivated, though the beginner's task is to hold off until then.
Practice this in Stoa
Guided courses in the Stoa app that put this into daily practice.
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Sources
- Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library