Question
What does Epictetus mean by saying every situation has two handles?
A short look at Handbook 43, where Epictetus turns a jug's two handles into a lesson about how to pick up any event.
Updated
The short answer
Epictetus means that any event can be truly described in more than one way, but only one of those descriptions gives you something to act on. The lesson is not to deny what happened, but to take hold of the event by the description that is actually up to you to use.
Key points
- Epictetus compares a situation to a jug with two handles, one that can bear the weight of being carried and one that cannot.
- His example is a brother who has acted unjustly: the handle of his injustice cannot be carried, but the handle that he is your brother can.
- This applies the dichotomy of control from Handbook 1: one handle points to what is not up to you, the other to your own response, which is.
- The image is not a trick for finding a silver lining, since the fact you set aside stays just as true and just as bad.
- Discourses I 1 gives the deeper reason: only your own faculty of desire, aversion, pursuit, and avoidance was ever made fully yours to use.
The longer answer
Epictetus does not mean that every situation is really neutral, or that you can spin any hardship into a positive if you just choose the right attitude. The image is narrower and more useful than that. A jug has two handles: one lets you lift it, the other does not. A situation is the same. It presents itself to you carrying more than one true description, and only some of those descriptions let you act.
The example he gives is exact. Suppose your brother has wronged you. You can take hold of the event by the handle of his injustice. That handle is true. He did act unjustly. But Epictetus says that handle "cannot be carried" (Handbook 43): gripping the wrong done to you gives you nothing to do except resent it, relitigate it, or demand the world undo it, none of which is up to you. There is another handle on the same event, just as true: that he is your brother, that he was raised with you. That handle is "the one by which it may be carried" (Handbook 43), because it points to something you can act on: how you will treat him now.
Notice what Epictetus does not say. He does not say the injustice did not happen, or that you should pretend it does not matter. He is not offering a trick for feeling better. He is pointing out that a single event contains more than one accurate handle, and that only one of them is something a person can actually pick up and use. This is the same division that opens the Handbook: some things are in our control, and some are not (Handbook 1). Your brother's action is not in your control. Your response to him, what you do next, is. This connects to a claim Epictetus makes elsewhere and states more starkly. In the Discourses, he has Zeus tell him plainly that only one faculty was ever made fully his own: the faculty of desire, aversion, pursuit, and avoidance, in short, the faculty of using impressions well (Discourses I 1). Everything else, including your brother's character and choices, was always going to be partly outside your grip. So when Epictetus tells you to reach for the other handle, he is not asking you to reinterpret the facts. He is asking you to notice which fact you can actually do something with.
The common misreading turns this into an optimism trick: find the silver lining, choose to see the bright side. That is not what is happening. The brother's injustice is not reframed as secretly fine. It stays exactly as bad as it is. What changes is where you place your grip. You stop trying to lift the event by the handle that will not bear weight, the handle of judging, condemning, and dwelling on what he did, and you take hold of the handle that will: your own response, informed by the fact that this is your brother, someone you were raised alongside.
In practice this means pausing before you react and asking a plain question: which part of this can I use. Not which part is true, since both handles usually are, but which one gives you something to do. If a colleague is careless with a shared project, one handle is his carelessness. The other is that you still have to decide what you do next: how you speak to him, what you fix, what you let go. Reach for the handle built for your hand.
Primary passages
Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by which it cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, don't lay hold on the action by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be carried; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be carried.
Epictetus, Handbook 43 Read in context
The full image, given with Epictetus's own example of a brother's injustice.
Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.
Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context
The founding division the two handles apply: one handle points to what is not yours, the other to what is.
I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments
Epictetus, Discourses I 1 Read in context
Zeus's speech in the Discourses gives the deeper reason only one handle is ever truly yours to lift.
Important distinctions
Choosing a handle versus denying a fact
Reaching for the workable handle does not erase the other one. The brother's injustice remains real and remains unjust. What changes is which fact you build your next action on. Epictetus is not asking you to relabel a wrong as fine, only to stop trying to act from a fact that gives you no grip.
Two handles versus positive thinking
Positive thinking asks you to find a better feeling about the same event. The two handles are about action, not mood. The workable handle is workable because it connects to something in your control, your judgment and response, not because it feels nicer to hold.
Objections and replies
Isn't this just picking the interpretation that suits you?
A skeptic might say the two handles let you conveniently ignore whatever is inconvenient, such as real wrongdoing, by calling it the wrong handle.
Epictetus never denies the injustice. Both handles are true at once. The point is that only one of them, your own response, is something you can actually do anything with. Naming the other handle honestly and then setting it aside because it is not yours to fix is not evasion, it is accuracy about what is up to you.
Doesn't this ask people to excuse family and let injustice slide?
Choosing the brotherhood handle over the injustice handle can look like it tells you to overlook wrongdoing because of a relationship.
The text does not say to approve of the injustice or stop addressing it. It says your grip for action comes from your relationship and your own faculty of choice, not from dwelling on the wrong itself. You can still respond to the injustice, correct it, or set a boundary. What you cannot do is act well while gripping only the handle of resentment.
Practice this in Stoa
Guided courses in the Stoa app that put this into daily practice.
Related questions
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What does Epictetus mean by things in our control and not in our control?
A close look at the opening line of the Handbook, where Epictetus draws the line between what is up to us and what is not.
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What is really in my control according to the Stoics?
A look at Epictetus's opening claim in the Handbook: what actually counts as up to you, and why the answer is narrower than most people think.
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What is the Stoic teaching of the two handles in Epictetus's Handbook?
A short teaching from Epictetus on choosing how to grasp what happens to you, and why that choice is up to you even when the event is not.
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What maxims does Epictetus recommend keeping ready at hand?
A look at the three quotations Epictetus tells his students to hold close, and what they teach about accepting what is not up to us.
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How does Epictetus use the metaphor of an actor in a drama to describe our role in life?
A short lesson from the Handbook on why you do not choose your part, only how well you play it.
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What does Epictetus advise about desire and aversion for beginners?
Epictetus tells the beginner to suspend desire almost entirely and redirect aversion only toward what is truly up to them.
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Why does Epictetus say to call a dead child or spouse 'returned' rather than 'lost'?
Epictetus reframes loss as a return to correct a false judgment about what was ever yours to keep.
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How does Epictetus say we should respond when someone insults or wrongs us?
Epictetus argues that a person who insults you is not attacking something of yours, and that this fact should change how you respond.
Podcast discussions
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Michael Trombley and Caleb on Emily Wilson's Critique of Epictetus
Michael Trombley and Caleb examine classicist Emily Wilson's three criticisms of Epictetus and test whether they hold up against the Discourses and Handbook.
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The Stoics vs. Plato: Blank Slate or Innate Ideas
Michael Tremblay and Caleb Ontiveros compare the Stoic view of the mind as a blank slate with Plato's theory of innate knowledge, and what each means for self-knowledge.
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Caleb Ontiveros on Why Stoic Happiness Must Be Up to Us
Caleb Ontiveros and Michael Tremblay lay out and stress-test the Stoic case that happiness must depend on us, not on the world.
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Is Christopher Nolan's Odyssey More Stoic Than Homer's?
Caleb Ontiveros reads Christopher Nolan's film adaptation of the Odyssey against Stoic ideas about the gods, agency, duty, and perseverance.
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Ryan Holiday Runs Rome's Stoic Sites
Ryan Holiday narrates a solo 50-kilometer run past Rome's Stoic landmarks to draw out lessons about voluntary hardship and endurance.
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Stoic Lessons on Power and Complicity from Roman History
Two hosts tour Roman political history to argue that Stoic virtue demanded active participation in public life, not withdrawal from it.
Related concepts, philosophers and works
Sources
- Epictetus, Discourses I Primary text, Stoa library
- Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library